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Abstract
We construct a simple model incorporating various urban labour market phenom-
ena obtaining in developing economies, and we give a diagrammatic formulation of
the market equilibrium. Our initial formulation assumes an integrated labour market
and allows for entrepreneurship, self-employment, and wage employment. We then
introduce labour market segmentation. In equilibrium voluntary and involuntary
self-employment, formal and informal wage employment, and formal and informal
entrepreneurship may all coexist. We illustrate the model by an example calibrated
on Latin American data, examining individual labour market transitions and implica-
tions of education/training and labour market policies.
JEL classifications: O17, J23
1. Introduction
Urban labour markets in developing economies exhibit considerable diversity, typically
including substantial segments of both voluntary and involuntary self-employment and of
formal and informal wage employment. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example,
Perry et al. (2007) find that on average, 24% of urban employment is informal self-employ-
ment and 30% is informal wage employment, and each of these segments have significant
voluntary and involuntary elements.1 The aim of the present article is to formulate a simple
model that incorporates all of these labour market states, as well as different types of entre-
preneurship, and develop a diagrammatic analysis of market equilibrium. Some recent
literature on informality based on search-and-matching theory also incorporates the
1 See Fields (2009) for a general discussion of the complexity of labour markets in developing econo-
mies and of approaches to modelling them.
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interaction of several of these labour market states (Albrecht et al., 2009; Margolis et al.,
2012), but is rather complex and relies extensively on simulations to generate results.
In contrast to most of the theoretical literature on informality, we model in detail the
supply as well as the demand side of the labour market.2 We assume that each agent can al-
locate his or her labour to one of three activities: self-employment, wage employment, or
entrepreneurship (running a firm and providing wage employment to others).3 An agent is
characterized in terms of two skills, Y and Z, where, loosely speaking, Y is the ability to
produce and sell an output, and Z is managerial ability. Success as a self-employed worker
would depend on the amount y of skill Y possessed; but following the Lazear (2005) ‘jack-
of-all-trades’ formulation, success as an entrepreneur would depend on applying both skills
together, specifically, on the value of min(y,z), where z is the amount of Z the agent pos-
sesses. In wage employment, however, everyone is assumed to be equally able.4
We develop two versions of the model. First, in our benchmark case, we assume that the
market for wage employment clears, so that all labour states are ‘voluntary’. This is useful
for expositional purposes, providing the groundwork for the second version of the model,
in which we assume labour market segmentation. However, it is also of interest in its own
right because empirical evidence suggests that in some developing economies labour mar-
kets may be largely integrated (see, e.g., El Badaoui et al. 2008 on South Africa and for gen-
eral discussion of the empirical literature). In the second version we assume that
segmentation is the result of a minimum wage, with which there is full compliance in for-
mal employment. The simplicity of our diagrammatic formulation is thus bought at the
cost of this limitation of the model. In practice, however, the wage floor in formal work
might instead be the result of union bargaining or efficiency wage considerations, and there
may be limited compliance with a minimum wage. In the concluding section we briefly dis-
cuss the potential for generalizing the model to allow for these factors.
For the benchmark model, we begin by characterizing the supply function of an agent to
the three activities. Two cases are developed (depending on parameter values) that may be
interpreted as corresponding to different underlying macroeconomic conditions, and the
implications for labour market transitions that may occur as agents acquire greater skills
are discussed. The model also generates a demand for wage labour by those agents who
choose entrepreneurship. Given the joint distribution of y and z across individuals and a
flexible wage rate, we characterize the labour market equilibrium and examine its compara-
tive statics. We depict this equilibrium in a diagram which we later adapt to the second ver-
sion of the model.
In practice, informality is generally associated with smaller size (Perry et al., 2007). This
is because formal regulations may only apply to larger firms, and, insofar as they apply to
all firms, informal firms may eschew larger size to avoid detection.5 In the second version
of the model we therefore assume that the minimum wage rate applies only for firms above
2 Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) analyse both sides of the market, but their focus, in particular
their concern with the effects of social programs, is different from ours.
3 In the absence of functioning systems of unemployment insurance and protection from job loss,
open unemployment is ‘rarely an option’ for workers in developing economies (Ghosh, 2012).
4 This simplifying assumption is common in the informality literature. Its justification is that across
the population we may expect differences in the ability to perform wage work to be relatively small,
compared to ability in self-employment and entrepreneurship.
5 See Ahsan and Pages (2007) on India, and Almeida and Carneiro (2009) on Brazil.
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a certain size, with such firms being regarded as formal, and smaller firms as informal. For
this case we show that informal and formal wage employment can coexist with voluntary
and involuntary self-employment. If an agent who is rationed out of a formal wage job
chooses self-employment, this is involuntary in the sense that it is not the agent’s first
choice—though it is voluntary in the sense that it is chosen freely from the remaining op-
tions. Involuntary entrepreneurship may also obtain, that is, agents who are rationed out of
formal wage employment may choose, according to their second preference, to run a firm
and employ others.6 Our analysis is not restricted to any particular rationing scheme to al-
locate formal jobs between the subset of agents who would like to take them. We note,
however, that a potential inefficiency exists (in addition to the distortion caused by the min-
imum wage rate): agents who are lucky enough to gain formal jobs may actually have a
comparative advantage in self-employment. In equilibrium this has an adverse effect on
output by both informal and formal firms.
We end this section by considering briefly the transitions of workers between different
labour market states. The empirical literature on Latin America indicates that young people
tend to get informal jobs when they leave school, and these jobs are often used as a stepping
stone to acquire skills. Formal employment may later be obtained, but for many the ultim-
ate destination is voluntary self-employment (Perry et al., 2007; Bosch and Maloney, 2010;
Cunningham and Salvagno, 2011). Although our model is not dynamic, it is found to be
consistent with these observations.
To illustrate the model we explore an example calibrated so that it generates values that
correspond broadly to Latin American data. This generates some implications for policy, al-
beit tentative ones given the stylized nature of the model. First, to diminish informality, a
cut in the cost of formality may be more effective than an increase in the cost of informality.
Second, it is more effective to provide education and training that improves the ability to
produce and sell, rather than managerial skills. Third, policy changes that might have been
expected to favour entrepreneurship may reduce the total number of entrepreneurs, whilst
increasing (formal) employment and output by the relatively able ones.
Following the lead of Rauch (1991), many contributions to the informality literature,
including Fortin et al. (1997), Amaral and Quintin (2006), Fiess et al. (2010), and de Paula
and Scheinkman (2011), assume agents differ with respect to a single ability parameter.7
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) also include ‘bequests’ as a second dimension by which
agents are characterized, and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) incorporate into their
analysis secondary workers (from the same household as the head), showing that these
workers are likely to choose informal work. Although these analyses lay bare various
6 A related phenomonen in developed economies is the worker who is made redundant and then
uses his or her redundancy payment or savings to set up a business.
7 Rauch’s formulation incorporates informality into the framework developed by Lucas (1978).
Jovanovic (1994) generalizes Lucas’s approach in a different direction, including heterogeneity of
both labour and management skills, but he is not concerned with informality (see also Poschke,
2013). A variation of the approach in the present article is formulated by Bennett et al. (2012), with
individuals characterized in terms of both ability and risk aversion. It is found, for example, that the
allocation of workers between informal and formal employment depends on the source of the risk
involved in informal work (opportunistic non-payment by the employer or detection and penalties
imposed by the authorities).
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important issues underlying informality in practice, they do not allow for the simultaneous
existence of informal wage labour and informal self-employment. Gollin (2008) is an
exception, developing a dynamic equilibrium model of capital accumulation in which an
agent’s time is split between self-employment and working as a wage employee. However,
none of these contributions allow for the simultaneous existence of voluntary and involun-
tary informality.
Recently, a separate branch of the literature has grown, which develops search-
and-matching models of informality. In this framework additional labour market states can
be added at the cost of some complexity. In particular, in the formulation by Albrecht et al.
(2009) all choices are voluntary, and a worker can be in one of four states: unemployment,
informal self-employment, or formal wage employment either as a new hire (an outsider) or
as an insider with a higher wage. Ability is one-dimensional, and it is assumed only to affect
an agent’s productivity in a formal sector job. A simulation gives insight into how workers
respond to informal or formal job offers according to their ability and into the effects of dif-
ferent tax policies. A variation on this approach, with four labour market states (unemploy-
ment, self-employment, formal wage employment, and informal wage employment) is
formulated by Margolis et al. (2012) as the basis for empirical analysis of the Malaysian
labour market.
Section 2 formulates the benchmark version of the model, with a market-clearing wage
rate. Section 3 introduces labour market segmentation, and Section 4 applies the model in
the Latin American context, examining the policy conclusions. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
are given in the Appendix.
2. The benchmark model
Consider a large population P of agents, each of which is characterized in terms of two
skills, Y and Z. Y may be thought of as the ability to produce and sell, and Z as managerial
skill. An agent’s levels of Y and Z are distributed on the non-negative intervals y 2 ½y; y
and z 2 z; z , respectively. Skills are distributed across P according to f(y, z). Throughout,
for simplicity, we assume that f() is continuous and positive for all y and z.
Any agent may have one of three occupations: wage employment, self-employment, or
entrepreneurship. We assume a self-employed person does not employ others—rather, any
employment of others qualifies the person to be categorized as an entrepreneur.8
Regardless of an agent’s (y, z) characteristics, he or she has the same ability to do wage
work as any other person. However, for self-employment and entrepreneurship, ability
matters. If an agent with characteristics (y, z) is self-employed, he or she produces the quan-
tity y; that is, for self-employment ‘the ability to produce and sell’ matters, but ‘managerial
skills’ do not.9 If, alternatively, he or she is an entrepreneur, the relevant measure of skill is
8 This assumption is consistent with the definition Lazear (2005) gives of an entrepreneur as being
conceptually distinct from a self-employed person.
9 In practice self-employment covers a wide range of activity. Self-employed production with low y
may be, for example, construction work or street vending, whereas that with high y may be, for ex-
ample, professional work. A similar comment applies to entrepreneurial output.
230 SELF-EMPLOYMENT, WAGE EMPLOYMENT, INFORMALITY
 at R
oyal H
allam
shire H
ospital on Septem
ber 22, 2016
http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
min(y, z): A; that is, a balance of both types of skill matters.10 Such a person runs a firm
for which the production function is
x ¼ Ala; a 2 ð0;1Þ (1)
where x is output and l is the number of people the firm employs. Our specifications of pro-
duction are chosen to keep the analysis simple. The same qualitative results would be ob-
tained without the Leontief specification of A, provided the two types of skill are
sufficiently weak substitutes; and with some concavity of the production function for the
self-employed.
Let q and p be the prices for the output of the self-employed and entrepreneurial firms,
respectively, and let w be the money wage rate. An entrepreneur’s profit is therefore px –
wl, which, given eq. (1), is maximized at l ¼ l^ðAÞ, where
l^ðAÞ ¼ Apa
w
  1
1a
(2)
We assume that both self-employment and entrepreneurship give an agent a non-pecuniary
benefit v, which may be thought of as the desire for independence.11 Thus, letting UW, US,
and UE denote the utility from working, self-employment, and entrepreneurship, respect-
ively, we have
UW ¼ w; US ¼ qyþ v; UE ¼ pAl^ a wl^ þ v (3)
We shall only consider cases in which w> v, which is necessary for wage employment to
exist in equilibrium.
We partition P into three sets, W, S, and E, according to whether an agent’s first prefer-
ence is for wage employment, self-employment, or entrepreneurship, respectively.12 Thus,
the sets are defined by
W : UW > max UE;USð Þ
S : US > max UW;UEð Þ
E : UE > max ðUW;USÞ
(4)
10 Since we are concerned with relatively small firms, the productive and sales skills of the entrepre-
neur will generally matter for a firm’s success. De Mel et al. (2010) suggest that the case for a
jack-of-all-trades characterization is stronger if the market for business services is thin, as typic-
ally obtains in developing economies. Bloom et al. (2013) report on recent field experiments in de-
veloping countries that show that some forms of basic business training and advice can have
significant effects on performance in small enterprises.
11 Perry et al. (2007) stress the significance of this non-pecuniary benefit in Latin America and the
Caribbean. An implication in our model is that in equilibrium, depending on ability, some agents
could earn more in informal wage employment than from self-employment, whereas for others the
reverse is true. This is consistent with the mixed empirical evidence on which of these types of
earnings is the higher (see, e.g., Age´nor, 2007). With minor amendments, our analysis would still
apply if v¼ 0 or even if v< 0, in which case v might be interpreted as the disutility of extra effort
required from independent/entrepreneurial work.
12 Throughout, we simplify the exposition by only specifying strong preference.
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Using eqs (2) and (3), we can determine the borderline values of parameters underlying
eq (4):
UW?UE as A+BðwÞ (5)
UW?US as y+CðwÞ (6)
UE?US as A? ½DðwÞay1a  ~zðyÞ (7)
where BðwÞ  w=að Þa w vð Þ= 1  að Þð Þ1a=p; CðwÞ  ðw vÞ=q; and DðwÞ  w=pað Þ
q= p 1  að Þð Þð Þ 1að Þ=a. Note that BðwÞ  CðwÞR 0 as q=pRQðwÞ, where
QðwÞ ¼ aa 1  að Þ1a w v
w
 a
(8)
A relatively low q/p might be interpreted as reflecting strong aggregate demand, being
tilted towards the largely higher-quality output of entrepreneurial firms. Since
aa 1  að Þ1a 2 ð1=2; 1Þ; QðwÞ 2 ð0; 1Þ. Thus, if q<p then either q=p > QðwÞ or q=p <
QðwÞ; but if qp; q=p > QðwÞ.
Using eqs (5–8), Proposition 1 characterizes the allocation of agents to the three sets, W,
S, and E and Fig. 1 gives an intuitive illustration.
Proposition 1 Consider agent iyz with characteristics (y, z). (i) for q=p > QðwÞ; iyz 2W
if y<C(w); iyz 2 S if either y 2 CðwÞ;DðwÞð Þ or both y > DðwÞ and z < ~zðyÞ; and iyz 2 E
otherwise. (ii) for q=p < QðwÞ; iyz 2W if either y<B, or both y 2 BðwÞ;CðwÞð Þ and z < B
ðwÞ; iyz 2 S if y > CðwÞ and z < ~zðyÞ; and iyz 2 E otherwise.
In Fig. 1(a) q=p > QðwÞ, and in Fig. 1(b) q=p < QðwÞ. Thus, for given w, in Fig. 1(a)
self-employment is relatively more attractive, compared to entrepreneurship, than in
Fig. 1(b). For simplicity, it is assumed in these figures that y ¼ z and y ¼ z ¼ 0. Consider
Fig. 1(a), in which q=p > QðwÞ. For individuals with y<C(w) self-employment and entre-
preneurship both offer relatively low rewards and so wage employment is preferred.
If y>C(w) either self-employment or entrepreneurship is preferred. For C(w)< y<D(w)
Fig. 1. Labour allocation for (a) q/p>Q(w ); and (b) q/p<Q(w ).
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self-employment is preferred, but when y>D(w), entrepreneurship is preferred if z is large
enough, with the critical value of z increasing in y.13
The figures may be interpreted in terms of an agent’s transition between labour market
states as skills are acquired. Consider, for example, an agent with skill z¼ z1 in Fig. 1(a).
Starting from a low level, the acquisition of greater skill y enables a transition from W to S,
and then from S to E; but the acquisition of sufficiently high skill y enables a transition
back to S. Thus, for some agents, even for changes in y alone, the transition between labour
market states may be non-monotonic.14 Figure 1(b) is significantly different than Fig. 1(a)
in that as y rises, an agent may switch directly from W to E, with no intermediate stage S.
An implication is that, for increases in y (or z) alone, monotonicity obtains, though, as in
Fig. 1(a), some agents belong to S at the highest values of y even though at lower y they
would belong to E.
Remark 1 The mobility implications of education and training that affect individuals’
ability Y can depend on macroeconomic factors (p and q) as well as individual-specific ones
(Z here).
In Fig. 1(a), where q/p is low (strong aggregate demand) transitions may occur straight
from W to E, however small the increase in Y. But in Fig. 1(b), where q/p is high (weak ag-
gregate demand) only a relatively large addition to skill Y would enable direct transition
from W to E; in the absence of such large additions to skill, self-employment may play an
important transitional role.
Aggregating over P, we obtain the supplies of labour to the three activities. We denote
the total supplies to wage employment, self-employment, and entrepreneurship by Ls, SEs,
and Es, respectively. For each entrepreneur the demand for labour is given by l^ Að Þ in eq. (2)
and thus we obtain the total demand for labour, Ld.
Lemma 1 The comparative statics of the supply and demand for wage labour are as
follows:
Ldp > 0; L
d
q < 0; L
d
w < 0; L
s
q < 0; L
s
w > 0; L
s
v < 0
Ldv
¼ 0 for q=p > QðwÞ
> 0 for q=p < QðwÞ
;Lsp
¼ 0 for q=p > QðwÞ
< 0 for q=p < QðwÞ
8><
>:
8><
>:
The demand for wage labour is increasing in the price of the firms’ output and decreas-
ing in the money wage. It is decreasing in the price paid for the output of the self-employed
because a higher price for this output makes entrepreneurship relatively less attractive. A
greater benefit, v, from independence makes entrepreneurship (and self-employment) more
attractive relative to wage employment. However, this is only associated with more agents
choosing entrepreneurship if there are agents on the margin of choice between entrepre-
neurship and wage employment (Fig. 1(b)).
13 If there were some limited substitutability of the two skills in the entrepreneurial production func-
tion, there would be no straight boundaries between E and the other sets, but the properties of
the figure would be unaffected.
14 If there is incremental acquisition of both skills y and z, and this occurs sequentially over time,
then repeated switches between E and S are also possible.
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The supply of wage labour is increasing in the money wage rate, and decreasing in the
price of self-employed output and benefit from independence. If the output price p is higher
then, again, provided there are agents on the margin of choice between entrepreneurship
and wage employment (Fig. 1(b)), wage employment becomes less attractive relative to
entrepreneurship for these agents, and so the supply of wage labour is lower.
We can now specify sufficient conditions for equilibrium in the labour market, including
the coexistence of wage employment and self employment. We denote the lowest and high-
est levels of A in P by A and A, respectively, and we define w and w as
UE A;wð Þ ¼ UW wð Þ; UE A;w 	 ¼ UW wð Þ (9)
Thus, w is the level of the wage w at which an agent with A ¼ A would be indifferent be-
tween being an entrepreneur and a worker, and w is defined similarly for A ¼ A.
Proposition 2 If UE A;wð Þ < US y
 
< UW wð Þ < US yð Þ < UE A;w 	 then there exists a
wage w 2 w;wð Þ such that Ld wð Þ ¼ Ls wð Þ and the sets E, S, W are non-empty.
Depending on whether the market-clearing wage rate w* is such that q/p>Q(w*) or
q/p<Q(w*), Fig. 1(a) or 1(b), respectively, can be interpreted as representing this
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium (w¼w*), dw=dp > 0; dw=dq? 0, and dw/dv> 0; and total
wage employment L satisfies
dL
dp
> 0
( if q=p > QðwÞ;
if q=p < QðwÞ and LdpLsw  LdwLsp > 0
dL=dq < 0;
dL
dv
< 0 if q=p > QðwÞ
? 0 if q=p < QðwÞ
8<
:
If the price p of the entrepreneurial output is higher then Ld is greater, as is w*. Set W is
therefore larger, subject, when q/p<Q(w*), to a stability condition. If the output price q
for the self-employed is higher, the greater attractiveness of self-employment is associated
with lower supply of and lower demand for wage labour, the latter effect arising because
the supply of entrepreneurship is smaller. Thus, W is smaller, but the net effect on w* may
be of either sign. A greater desire for independence v stimulates both self-employment
(reducing the supply of wage labour) and entrepreneurship (increasing the demand for
wage labour). The latter effect implies a greater demand for wage labour, but as the supply
of wage labour is smaller we can only sign the effect on W when q/p>Q(w*).
3. Labour market segmentation
We now examine the equilibrium that obtains when the wage rate w is fixed by law, at wf,
above the market-clearing level w*. As first specified by Rauch (1991), we assume that
only firms above a certain threshold employment level l¼ l0 pay the minimum wage wf,
whereas firms with l l0 pay the market-clearing wage w¼wi. The former firms
are denoted ‘formal’ and the latter ‘informal’. In Rauch’s model (in which skill is one-
dimensional) there is a critical entrepreneurial skill level above which formality is chosen,
234 SELF-EMPLOYMENT, WAGE EMPLOYMENT, INFORMALITY
 at R
oyal H
allam
shire H
ospital on Septem
ber 22, 2016
http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
with informality being chosen otherwise. In our model there is a critical level of A, A ¼ ~A,
that plays a similar role. This is the level of A at which the entrepreneur achieves the same
utility from operating informally at the maximum employment level l0 as from operating
formally at the higher, profit-maximizing employment level l^ðAÞ, that is,
UEð ~A;wi; l0Þ ¼ UEð ~A;wf ; l^ð ~AÞÞ (10)
Of agents choosing entrepreneurship, those with A > ~A choose formality. As in Rauch’s
model there is a gap in the size distribution of firms at A ¼ ~A.
With this revised model, the utility from self-employment is the same as in eq. (3), but
we now distinguish the respective utilities, Uf and Ui from formal and informal wage work:
US ¼ qyþ v; UWf ¼ wf ; UWi ¼ wi (11)
The utilities from formal and informal entrepreneurship are denoted by UEf and UEi,
where
UEj ¼ pAl^
a
j wjl^ j þ v; j ¼ f ; i (12)
For an informal entrepreneur ðA ~AÞ, if there were no constraint on informal employment
we would have li ¼ l^ iðAÞ ¼ Apa=wið Þ1= 1að Þ. So the constraint l l0 binds exactly if
Apa=wið Þ1= 1að Þ ¼ l0; that is, if A ¼ wil1a0 =pa  A0. Thus, for firms operating informally,
li ¼
l^ iðAÞ if A0 > A;
l0 if ~AAA0
(
and for firms operating formally
lf ¼ l^ f ¼
Apa
wf
  1
1a
The population P can be partitioned into four sets according to their first preferences in
the labour market.15 In the Appendix we specify the inequalities parallel to eqs (5–8) that
underlie these first preferences (as well as those underlying second preferences). Our nota-
tion will be to write in parentheses f for formal and i for informal, and then add a subscript
V for voluntary and I for involuntary if a further distinction is necessary. Thus, all agents
belong to one of the following sets.
i. Formal entrepreneurship, denoted E(f ); defined by UEf > max ðUEi;US;UWf Þ.
ii. Voluntary informal entrepreneurship, denoted EVðiÞ; defined by UEi > max
ðUEf ;US;UWf Þ.
iii. Voluntary self-employment, denoted SV; defined by US > max ðUEf ;UEi;UWf Þ.
iv. Formal employment, denoted W(f); defined by UWf > max ðUEf ;UEi;USÞ.
Set W(f) can be partitioned into those agents who obtain a formal job (set Wðf Þþ)
and those who do not (set Wðf Þ). Members of set Wðf Þ attain their second preferences,
15 For each agent, the first preference is ‘voluntary’, but we only use this term in naming a set if the
distinction will be necessary where we specify ‘involuntary’ sets (for which a similar comment
applies).
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that is, they allocate their labour ‘involuntarily’. Each belongs to one of the following
sets.16
i. Involuntary informal entrepreneurs, denoted EIðiÞ; defined by UEi > max ðUS;UWiÞ.
ii. Involuntary self-employed, denoted SI; defined by US > max ðUEi;UWiÞ.
iii. Informal employees, denoted W(i); defined by UWi > max ðUEi;USÞ.
Proposition 3 Suppose firms may be formal, with l> l0 and paying wage wf, where
wf>w*, or informal, with l l0 and paying the market clearing wage wi. Then the sets
E(f), EV(i), SV, Wðf Þþ, EI(i), SI, and W(i) may, simultaneously, all be non-empty in
equilibrium.
We prove the proposition by giving an example in which, indeed, the sets E(f), EV(i), SV,
Wðf Þþ, EI(i), SI, and W(i) are, simultaneously non-empty in equilibrium. We delay giving
this example until Section 5, however, where we relate it to Latin American data, because
we wish to consider this example in its own right. The sets listed in the proposition are not
necessarily non-empty, and degenerate equilibria may easily be formulated (e.g., if q/p were
sufficiently high all agents would belong to set SV). But we focus on cases in which all the
sets (except possibly EI(i)) are non-empty because these correspond to the labour markets
observed in practice.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Fig. 2, which is a development of Fig. 1, and can be inter-
preted as representing the equilibrium with endogenous adjustment of wi. As previously,
the cases shown correspond to different ranges of q/p relative to Q, but whereas in Fig. 1 Q
was a function of the single wage rate w*, now there are two wage rates, wf and wi in the
model. The relevant formulation is Q(wi,wj) with j¼ f, i, where the first argument is the
unit cost of labour to the entrepreneur and the second is the wage earned in activity j.17
This is derived in the Appendix, along with the borderline parameter values Bð; Þ; CðÞ,
and DðÞ shown in Fig. 2. Figure 2(a) illustrates the case in which q=p > Qðwi;wf Þ >
Qðwi;wiÞ, which corresponds to the case shown in Fig. 1(a); in Fig. 2(b) Qðwi;wf Þ >
q=p > Qðwi;wiÞ, which is essentially a hybrid of the Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) cases; and in
Fig. 2(c) Qðwi;wf Þ > Qðwi;wiÞ > q=p, which corresponds to Fig. 1(b). Each of the panels
can be explained in three steps.18
First, using eqs (1–7) with w¼wf and eq. (10), we determine the (y, z) characteristics of
the members of the ‘first-preference’ sets E(f), EV(i), SV, and W(f). The first three of these
sets are shown unshaded, whereas set W(f) is shown by the entire shaded area in each
panel.
Second, because the rationing scheme has not been specified, note that membership of
set Wðf Þþ may come from anywhere in the shaded area (set Wðf Þ) in each panel.
Third, disregarding temporarily the allocation of agents to set Wðf Þþ, we treat the shaded
area in the same way as we did the whole of (y, z) space in Fig. 1(a) and 1(b). Thus, for the
16 No (y, z) combinations exist for which both (i) formal employment is first preference and (ii) formal
entrepreneurship second preference, that is, involuntary formal entrepreneurship is not feasible.
17 In Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) QðwÞ is the critical value of q/p determining whether the borderline value of
y (and of z for entrepreneurship) at which UW¼UE is greater or less than that at which
UW¼US. Now two different values of Q come into play, depending on whether an employed
agent earns wf or wi.
18 If wf is not significantly above w* the horizontal boundary of the set E(f) will meet the upwards-
sloping boundary of set EV(i) and terminate there.
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agents concerned, we show the preference amongst the three options of entrepreneurship,
self-employment, and informal wage employment, given that all three options are involuntary
in the sense that these agents would prefer formal wage employment. Hence we determine the
‘second-preference’ sets EI(i), SI, and W(i), with the proviso that a selection of agents with
(y, z) characteristics consonant with these sets, belong instead to set Wðf Þþ.
For a given (y, z) distribution, we assume that wi adjusts endogenously such that infor-
mal wage labour supply (from set W(i)) equals informal wage labour demand (from set
EVðiÞ [ EIðiÞ). The other allocations are determined simultaneously. It can be seen that rela-
tively highly skilled agents with a balanced skill set become formal entrepreneurs, whilst
those not quite so highly skilled and/or with not quite so balanced skill sets become volun-
tary informal entrepreneurs. Agents with a high y but sufficiently low z become voluntarily
self-employed.
In Fig. 2(a), the return to self-employment is relatively high (q=p > Qðwi;wf Þ >
Qðwi;wiÞ). Consequently, there is no involuntary informal entrepreneurship, involuntary
self-employment being preferred instead. However, the return to self-employment is not so
Fig. 2. Labour allocation for (a) q/p>Q(wi,wf )>Q(wi,wi ); (b) Q(wi,wf )>q/p>Q(wi,wi ); and
(c) Q(wi,wf )>Q(wi,wi )>q/p. Shaded area denotes the setW(f).
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high in Fig. 2(b) and 2(c), and so some involuntary entrepreneurship obtains, with the
agents concerned having lower values of A¼min(y, z) than voluntary entrepreneurs.
Roughly speaking, involuntary informal entrepreneurs have high values of z, but intermedi-
ate values of y, although a member of set SI may have more of both skills than a member of
set EI(i).
Remark 2 The rationing scheme for formal wage employment may create an (additional)
inefficiency, with output being forgone from self-employment, and both informal and for-
mal entrepreneurial firms.
Unless the formal wage employees are those with the smallest y endowments in the
shaded area in each panel of Fig. 2, some output by the involuntarily self-employed is for-
gone. Also, in Fig. 2(b) and 2(c), insofar as some agents from the shaded area associated
with EI(i) gain formal employment, there is a negative effect on informal wage labour de-
mand and the supply of informal output. This negatively affects the informal wage rate wi,
causing substitution out of formal wage employment and output.
In each panel of Fig. 2 an agent with low skills will—unless they manage to obtain for-
mal wage employment—begin in set W(i). As they acquire skills, they will move north-east
in the figure, perhaps shifting into set SI. Nonetheless, there is a possible non-monotonic
transition in the sense that if an agent moves from (involuntary) self-employment into a for-
mal wage job, they may then go back to (voluntary) self-employment if their skills develop
sufficiently.19 Our model is thus broadly consistent with the empirical evidence on Latin
American transitions. However, there are significant differences between the panels in
Fig. 2 in terms of the possible transitions from informal wage work to entrepreneurship. If
skills are acquired incrementally, in Fig. 2(a) an agent will move through intermediate
stages of involuntary and voluntary self-employment. In Fig. 2(b), where q/p is not as great
as in Fig. 2(a), the only intermediate stage is involuntary self-employment, whilst in
Fig. 2(c), where q/p is lower still, there is no intervening stage of self-employment.
4. An application to Latin American data
To illustrate the model we calibrate it using Latin American data. We assume a joint log-
normal distribution of skills Y and Z:
f y; zð Þ ¼ e
k=2r2
2pr2yz
where k  log yð Þ2 þ log zð Þ2 and r is a constant. We fix a¼ 0.5, for there appears no com-
pelling justification for any particular calibration of this parameter. We set l0¼ 5 on the
basis of the survey of informality by Oviedo et al. (2009), who note that informal firms
‘mostly’ have five or fewer employees.
The remaining parameters — p, q, v, wf, r — are calibrated such that our model
matches some recent statistics for various countries in Latin America and the Caribbean re-
ported by Perry et al. (2007). These are that the proportions of paid private non-domestic
employment in urban areas (excluding entrepreneurs) are 37% formal waged, 28%
informal waged, and 34% and self-employed, whilst the informal wage is around 59% of
19 As in the benchmark model, if q/p is sufficiently large, there can be non-monotonic transitions
from self-employment to entrepreneurship and back again.
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the formal wage.20 As we have one additional parameter to calibrate relative to the number
of statistics, we impose one further restriction to identify a unique calibration, that the
benefit from independence v is 10% of the minimum wage wf.
21
We search numerically for the parameter values that obtain in our model under the as-
sumption that the rationing scheme for allocating agents in set W(f) to set Wðf Þþ is ran-
dom. Because we use a dense lattice to approximate the infinite population of agents
assumed in the model, a small degree of coarseness prevents us from matching these statis-
tics with absolute precision. However, after adjusting the first three statistics above to ac-
count for entrepreneurs, the reported estimates (shown under Table 1) match to within 1
percentage point. For these calibrated parameter values, the price of entrepreneurial output
p is around two-thirds higher than the price of self-employed output q. Table 1 shows the
comparative statics of various parameter changes. The first five columns show the signs for
small increases in the value of each of the parameters listed, and last two columns give the
effects of positive incremental shifts in the distributions shown.
The comparative statics signs shown in the table can be understood intuitively for any
parameter by considering the effect on first preferences and then on second preferences.
Consider, for example, an increase in the self-employed price q. Because there are no agents
on the borderline of choice between formal entrepreneurship and self-employment, this has
no effect on set E(f), and therefore none on Wðf Þþ. However, it causes a switch in first pref-
erences away from formal employment and informal entrepreneurship towards self-
employment, and so set EV(i) becomes smaller and SV larger. The higher value of q also
Table 1. An example for Latin America
Baseline (% of P) Parameter change
q p v wf l0 Y Z
jEðf Þj ¼ 0:63 0 þ þ   þ þ
jEVðiÞj ¼ 6:86    þ   þ
jEIðiÞj ¼ 0:09    þ   
jEðf Þ [ EVðiÞ [ EIðiÞj  þ  þ   þ
jSV j ¼ 23:35 þ  þ  þ þ 
jSIj ¼ 7:77 þ  þ þ   
jSV [ SIj þ  þ þ  þ 
jWðf Þþj ¼ 35:40 0 þ þ   þ þ
jWðiÞj ¼ 25:99    þ þ  þ
jWðf Þþ [WðiÞj  þ   þ  þ
wi=wf ¼ 0:5807  þ þ  þ þ þ
Notes: q ¼ 0:55; p ¼ 0:9; a ¼ 0:5; v ¼ 0:1;wf ¼ 1:1; l0 ¼ 5; r ¼ 1:63:
20 The proportions of employment are cross-country averages derived from Table 2.1 of Perry et al.
(2007), which uses the social protection/legal definition of informality. There is wide variation
across countries and types of worker in the formal-informal wage gap. The figure of 59% in the
text relates to an average-earnings job in Argentina.
21 This value is consistent with recent research reviewed by Carter (2010)—albeit for developed
economies—which argues that the compensating differential from self-employment is substan-
tially smaller than the widely cited estimate of Hamilton (2000) of 35% of equivalent employment
income.
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causes a shift towards self-employment as a second preference, and so set SI becomes larger,
but W(i) and EI(i) smaller. Although the supply of informal labour falls, the decrease in the
demand dominates and wi falls. Overall, there are more self-employed and fewer entrepre-
neurs and wage workers. Similar explanations can be given for other parameter changes,
but for brevity we focus on some potential policy tools.
First, consider changes in parameters wf and l0. l0 can be regarded as a policy tool even
if it is not fixed by government regulation; changes in the probability of detection of infor-
mality or in the penalties when caught would affect the informal employment level that
entrepreneurs are willing to set. A lower wf is a reduced cost of formality, whereas a lower
l0, limiting informal firm size further can be interpreted as an increased cost of informality.
We might expect each of these changes to result in less informality. Indeed, reducing wf
does cause E(f) and W(f)þ to become larger, whilst EV(i) and W(i) become smaller.
However, whilst a reduction in l0 also causes E(f) and Wðf Þþ to expand and W(i) to con-
tract, the effect on informal activity is not clear-cut, for it expands EV(i) and EI(i). Thus, in
this example, if the aim is to reduce informality, a reduction in wf might be preferred.
Nonetheless, although a reduction in the minimum wage rate is a shift towards the (static)
first best, the reduction it causes in the number of informal entrepreneurs may also have an
adverse longer-term effect if informal entrepreneurship provides a learning experience for
some potential future formal entrepreneurs.
Second, the results are suggestive of the effects of different types of education/training.
In Table 1 a general increase in skill Z expands both E(f) and EV(i), as well as Wðf Þþ and
W(i), whilst both SV and SI are diminished. However, a general increase in skill Y, with or
without an associated increase in Z, diminishes EV(i) and W(i), whilst a switch occurs into
SV from SI. Suppose that both general education and on-the-job training would increase the
stock of Y, whereas specialist management training is required to increase the stock of Z.
This suggests that, if the aim is to reduce informality then, because of the role played by
voluntary self-employment, general education and on-the-job training is more effective.
5. Concluding comments
We construct a parsimonious model that captures some of the complexity that obtains in
urban labour markets in developing economies. In the benchmark version the labour mar-
ket is unsegmented and agents may be in one of three states—self-employment, wage em-
ployment, and entrepreneurship. The second version of the model adds labour market
segmentation. In equilibrium, voluntary and involuntary self-employment, formal and in-
formal wage employment, and formal and informal entrepreneurship (the latter possibly
dividing into voluntary and involuntary components) may all coexist. We also develop a
diagrammatic interpretation of the segmented and the unsegmented cases.
Our analysis suggests the importance of underlying macroeconomic conditions in deter-
mining the effects of education and training on transitions of individuals between labour
market states, and that these transitions may be non-monotonic. The role of the rationing
scheme by which workers are selected for formal jobs is also highlighted. As an illustration,
a numerical example is developed that generates results that correspond closely to Latin
American experience. In this example, if the government wishes to reduce informality, re-
duction of the costs of formality is generally more effective than increasing the costs of in-
formality, whilst education and training that improves the ability of individuals to produce
and sell is more effective than increasing managerial skills.
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These results are obtained from a highly stylized model, in particular from the assump-
tion of a competitive labour market, the only imperfection being that a minimum wage
must be paid by formal employers. However, we conjecture that some alternative assump-
tions could be accommodated into our framework relatively easily. For example, partial
compliance by formal firms with the minimum wage law would shift the boundary between
formal and informal entrepreneurship to the south-west in Fig. 2 (assuming that expected
penalties for detection are not too large). The potential effects would include a substitution
into formal from informal entrepreneurship and, as the informal wage would be driven up,
there would also be a substitution out of informal entrepreneurship into voluntary and
involuntary self-employment.
Similar effects would be obtained if trade unions were included in the model, with in-
siders and outsiders amongst formal-firm employees. However, a more radical overhaul of
the analysis would be required to allow for decentralized bargaining between unions and
employers, or for efficiency wages. For example, in a moral hazard or nutritional model it
would have to be taken into account how worker productivity depends on wage rates. A
more straightforward generalization that might be made would be to allow for heterogen-
ous innate ability in wage work. Amongst other factors that might be included are free la-
bour provided by the family and wealth and liquidity constraints that might hold back both
self-employment and entrepreneurship.
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Appendix
Proposition 1 Consider first the conditions under which wage employment is preferred. If
q=p > QðwÞ then C<B. Since A y, we have that y < CðwÞ ) A y < CðwÞ < BðwÞ; that
is, eq. (6) is sufficient for eq. (5) to be satisfied. If q=p < QðwÞ then BðwÞ < CðwÞ. To satisfy
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eqs (5) and (6), we need either y < BðwÞ or y 2 BðwÞ;CðwÞð Þ and z < BðwÞ (since A z, so
that z < BðwÞ is sufficient for A<B(w)).
Now consider the conditions under which self-employment is preferred. We have seen
that y > CðwÞ ) US > UW, so now consider what is required for US>UE. First, suppose
A¼ z; then, from eq. (7), UE>US if A > ½DðwÞay1a  ~zðyÞ. For this to be consistent with
A¼ z we require y ~zðyÞ. Note that, for y>0, ~zðyÞ has a unique fixed point, ~zðDðwÞÞ ¼
DðwÞ, and that ~z0 ðyÞ ¼ ð1  aÞ½DðwÞaya > 0, so that ~z0 ðDðwÞÞ ¼ 1  a < 1. Because also
~z00ðyÞ ¼ að1  aÞ½DðwÞaya1 < 0, this implies that y?DðwÞ , y? ~zðyÞ. Hence, if
y > DðwÞ, we have US > UE, z < ~zðyÞ. Alternatively, suppose A¼y. Then, from eq. (7)
y < DðwÞ ) US > UE.
Hence US>UE if either (i) y < DðwÞ or (ii) y > DðwÞ and z < ~zðyÞ. Therefore US
> max UW;UEð Þ when either (i) y 2 min CðwÞ;DðwÞð Þ;DðwÞð Þ or (ii) y > max
CðwÞ;DðwÞð Þ and z < ~zðyÞ. But also, from eqs (5), (7), and (8) we have that
BðwÞ DðwÞ? 0 , q=pcQðwÞ. Therefore, since BðwÞ  CðwÞR 0 as q=pRQðwÞ, we
have q=pRQðwÞ , CðwÞ?BðwÞ?DðwÞ, and the conditions stated in the proposition
under which self-employment is preferred follow. The conditions under which entrepre-
neurship is preferred then follow.
Lemma 1 First we find from eq. (2) and eqs (6–7) that l^ p > 0; l^ q ¼ 0; l^w < 0; l^ v ¼ 0;
BpðwÞ < 0; BqðwÞ ¼ 0; BwðwÞ > 0; BvðwÞ < 0; CpðwÞ ¼ 0; CqðwÞ < 0; CwðwÞ >
0; CvðwÞ < 0; DpðwÞ < 0; DqðwÞ > 0; DwðwÞ > 0; DvðwÞ ¼ 0; ~zp < 0; ~zq > 0; ~zw >
0; ~zv ¼ 0. Using Proposition 1, we then specify the supply of individuals to wage employ-
ment and entrepreneurship:
Ls ¼
ðC
y
ðz
z
f ðy; zÞdzdy for q=p > QðwÞ
ðB
y
ðz
z
f ðy; zÞdzdyþ
ðC
B
ðB
z
f ðy; zÞdzdy for q=p < QðwÞ
8>>><
>>>:
Es ¼
ðy
D
ðz
~zðyÞ
f ðy; zÞdzdy for q=p > QðwÞ
ðC
B
ðz
B
f ðy; zÞdzdyþ
ðy
C
ðz
~zðyÞ
f ðy; zÞdzdy for q=p < QðwÞ
8>>><
>>>:
Inserting l^ Að Þ into each double integral in ES we obtain labour demand, Ld. Using A :
min(y,z), this can be written
Ld ¼
ðy
D
ðy
~zðyÞ
l^ zð Þf ðy; zÞdzdyþ
ðy
D
ðz
y
l^ yð Þf ðy; zÞdzdy q=p > QðwÞ
ðC
B
ðy
B
l^ zð Þf ðy; zÞdzdyþ
ðC
B
ðz
y
l^ yð Þf ðy; zÞdzdy
þ
ðy
C
ðy
~zðyÞ
l^ zð Þf ðy; zÞdzdyþ
ðy
C
ðz
y
l^ yð Þf ðy; zÞdzdy
q=p < QðwÞ
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
Differentiating Ls and Ld by (p, q, w, v), the lemma is obtained.
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Proposition 2 From eq. (9), w ¼ w )W ¼ ;; w ¼ w) E ¼ ;. Therefore, Ls wð Þ ¼ 0;
Ld wð Þ ¼ 0. If w ¼ w; UE A;w 	 > US A 	) E 6¼ ; ) Ld > 0; and if w ¼ w; UW wð Þ >
US yð Þ )W 6¼ ; ) Ls > 0. It follows that if both UE A;w 	 > US A 	 and UW wð Þ >
US yð Þ, the excess demand functions satisfy Ld wð Þ  Ls wð Þ > 0 and Ld wð Þ  Ls wð Þ < 0.
Then, by the continuity of LdLS, there must exist a w 2 w;wð Þ such that
LdðwÞ  LsðwÞ ¼ 0. Additionally, if w ¼ w then UE A;wð Þ < US Að Þ ) S 6¼ ;, and if
w ¼ w then UW wð Þ < US yð Þ ) S 6¼ ;. The proposition follows.
Lemma 2 Writing labour supply and supply as Lsðw; iÞ and Ldðw; iÞ, respectively, where
i ¼ ðp; q; vÞ, when w ¼ w; dw=di ¼ ðLdi  Lsi Þ=ðLsw  LdwÞ. Using Lemma 1 with this equa-
tion yields dw=dp > 0; dw=dq? 0, and dw=dv > 0. Thus, (i) dL=dp ¼ Ldwðdw=dpÞþ
Ldp ¼ ðLdpLsw  LdwLspÞ=ðLsw  LdwÞ; from Lemma 1, Ldw  Lsw < 0 and if q=p > QðwÞ; Lsp ¼ 0
and the result for dL / dp follows; (ii) dL=dq ¼ ðLdqLsw  LdwLsqÞ=ðLsw  LdwÞ < 0; (iii)
dL=dv ¼ ðLdvLsw  LdwLsvÞ=ðLsw  LdwÞ and the result in the lemma follows.
Borderline preferences with labour market segmentation
To compare the utilities from the different activities we use eqs (11) and (12).
Self-employment versus wage employment. Since wf>wi, UWf>UWi. Thus, to consider
first preferences, we compare US with UWf. If the agent is rationed out of a formal job,
second preferences matter, so we compare US with UWi. Thus we obtain
US?UWj as y?
1
q
ðwj  vÞ  CðwjÞ; j ¼ f ; i
Because wf>wi, Cðwf Þ > CðwiÞ.
Entrepreneurship versus self-employment. As an entrepreneur, an individual chooses
formality if A > ~A, but informality otherwise. This gives two comparisons with self
employment:
UEj?US as A?
1
pl^
a
j
ðqyþwjl^ jÞ  ~zjðyÞ; j ¼ f ; i
As in Section 2, denote the fixed points of ~zjðyÞ as DðwjÞ, j ¼ f ; i; that is,
~zjðDðwjÞÞ ¼ DðwjÞ.
Entrepreneurship versus wage employment. With respect to the agent’s first preference,
we compare UEi with UWf, and if the agent is rationed out of a formal job, we compare
UEi with UWi:
UEi?UWj as A?
1
plai
ðwj þwili  vÞ  B wi;wj
 	
; j ¼ f ; i
where the first argument of Bð:; :Þ is the wage paid as an entrepreneur and the second argu-
ment is the wage received as an employee.
We can now define corresponding values of Qð:; :Þ. Bðwi;wjÞ  CðwjÞ? 0 as q=p?
Qðwi;wjÞ,where
Qðwi;wjÞ  wj  v
liðwj þwilai  vÞ
; j ¼ f ; i
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